Political activism as a determinant of clientelistic transfers: Evidence from an Indian public works program
Description
Are political activists preferentially targeted by politicians engaging in clientelistic transfers to bolster political support? We provide the first model to highlight two possible rationales for such transfers: to mobilize support from the activists themselves, or to mobilize support from the voters over whom these activists have influence. Using novel household-level data on ex ante political affiliation and jobs received under a large-scale decentralized workfare program in India, we find that activists are indeed preferentially targeted. Furthermore, such transfers are more pronounced in locations where citizen political participation is less common, and in remote and less connected areas where activists’ role in information dissemination is most critical. We argue that the evidence is consistent with the use of transfers to leverage activists’ influence over the decision-making of other voters. Our results are not driven by self-selection, reverse causality, or other program transfers, and are robust to alternative definitions of “activism.”
Copyright Date
January 2017
Publication Date
1-1-2017
Keywords
Political clientelism, Political activism, NREGS, India
Conference
Society for Economics Research in India, 28-29 July, 2017
