Analyzing conflict within a contested land: The case of Kashmir
Description
This paper uses the case of Kashmir to examine the relationship between the people of a contested region (Indian-administered Kashmir) and one of the nation-states claiming it (India) within a game-theoretic framework. The study is motivated by the apparent contradiction between the limited democratic space in Kashmir—relative to other Indian states—and the consistently rigid stance adopted by the Indian government on the issue, despite the founding principles of the nation emphasizing democratic governance. We develop a political economy model to analyze how citizens’ allegiance to competing nation-states (India or Pakistan) influences the policy choices of the incumbent state. Specifically, the model captures how the basis of citizens’ allegiance—whether driven by partisan identity or policy preferences—shapes the government’s strategic behavior toward the region. The analysis suggests that when the government perceives citizens’ allegiance to be determined primarily by partisan loyalties rather than by their evaluation of policies, it optimally focuses on minimizing deviations from its most preferred policy, rather than accommodating alternative preferences. This behavior helps explain the persistence of rigid policy approaches toward Kashmir. More broadly, the findings highlight critical factors that may need to be addressed for any meaningful peace-building process to take shape, including the underlying basis of political allegiance and the role of participatory governance in contested regions.
Copyright Date
January 2010
Publication Date
1-1-2010
Keywords
Public policy, Conflict in Kashmir, Partisanships and conflict, Policy of the Indian Government toward Kashmir, Lack of democratic space in Kashmir
Conference
6th Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development, 16-18 December, 2010, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi
