Ethnic conflicts, rumours and an informed agent
Description
Rumours often precipitate ethnic conflicts and cause immense damage to life and property. There may exist an agent who knows if the rumour is true or false. We analyze a cheap talk game with multiple audiences (ethnicities) to see how this informed agent (b) may influence the outcome of rumours by sending strategic signals. Since b is biased towards her own ethnicity, she finds it difficult to convince the other ethnicity that she is giving them correct information. We show that even if b is known to be biased towards her own ethnicity, peace is possible in equilibrium. Additionally, we prove that there are only three equilibrium outcomes possible in symmetric strategies. Conflict is inevitable in one. The other outcomes have the following features. One, there may be peace whenever b deems it possible. Two, while b gives more informative signals to her own ethnicity, she may misinform a segment of her own ethnicity in equilibrium.
Copyright Date
January 2014
Publication Date
1-1-2014
Keywords
Ethnic conflicts, Cheap talk, Multiple audiences, Private signals, Pay off externalities
Conference
33rd Australasian Economic Theory Workshop, 12-13 February, 2015, Deakin University, Melbourne
