Political activism as a determinant of clientelistic transfers: Evidence from an Indian public works program

Description

Are political activists preferentially targeted by politicians engaging in clientelistic transfers to bolster political support? We provide the first model to highlight two possible rationales for such transfers: to mobilise support from the activists themselves, or to mobilise support from electors over whom these activists have influence. Using novel household data on ex ante political affiliation and jobs received subsequent to a large-scale decentralised workfare programme in India, we find that activists are indeed preferentially targeted. Furthermore, such transfers are more pronounced in locations where citizen political involvement is less common, and in remote and less connected areas where activists’ role in information transmission is most critical. We argue that the evidence is consistent with the use of transfers to leverage the influence of activists over the decision-making of other electors. Our results are not driven by self-selection, reverse causality or other programme transfers, and are robust to alternative definitions of “activism.”

Publication Date

1-1-2017

Publisher

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

Keywords

Political clientelism, Political activism, NREGS, India

Source Link URL

http://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/132240/filename/132452.pdf

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