On existence of pure strategy equilibrium with endogenous income
Document Type
Article
Publication Title
Social Choice and Welfare
Abstract
It is well known that in a voting-over-income-taxation game, there exists no pure strategy equilibrium when voters’ incomes are exogenous (i.e., when individual voters make only consumption choices). I prove that in an environment with endogenous income (i.e., where individual voters make labor-leisure choices, in addition to consumption choices) and candidates propose marginally progressive taxes, it is possible to get existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium tax schedule.
Publication Date
1-4-2011
Publisher
Springer
Volume
Vol.37
Issue
Iss.1
Recommended Citation
Munshi, Soumyanetra, "On existence of pure strategy equilibrium with endogenous income" (2011). Faculty Publications. 800.
https://research.iimb.ac.in/fac_pubs/800
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