Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains

Authors

Sarvesh Bandhu, Indian Institute of Management BangaloreFollow
Bishwajyoti Mondal, Shiv Nadar University, UP
Anup Pramanik, Shiv Nadar University, UP

Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Economics Letters

Abstract

In this paper, we provide a complete characterization of preference domains on which the Unanimity with Status-quo rule is strategy-proof. Further, we introduce a notion of “conflicting preference domains” and show that the Unanimity with Status-quo rule defined over these domains is strategy-proof.

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110164

Publication Date

1-12-2021

Publisher

Elsevier

Volume

Vol.210

Recommended Citation

Bandhu, Sarvesh; Mondal, Bishwajyoti; and Pramanik, Anup, "Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains" (2021). Faculty Publications. 106.
https://research.iimb.ac.in/fac_pubs/106